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Abstract 
A new electronic auction scheme is proposed based on group signatures and partially blind signatures. At the same security 
strengthen, an optimization was done on the processes of electronic auction scheme and the dependence on trusted third party was
reduced, moreover, multiple goods is auctioned at the same time, therefore, this scheme suited to large-scale electronic auction. 
Furthermore, due to application of vickrey auctions, the principle of optimal allocation of goods is easily satisfied.
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1.  Introduction 
Electronic auction which is one of the most important parts of electronic commerce is an electronic 
method of traditional auction. There are many types of auction categories [1 , the sealed bid auction which 
is used as the electronic auction and the open bid auction according to whether the price is opened, the 
single-round and the multi-round auction according to the number of rounds at the auction, the first-price 
auction and the vickrey auction according to the price of winning. 
]
Group signature [2  was firstly presented by Chaum and Heyst, which have anonymity, correctness, 
unforgeability, traceability, exculpability, unlinkability and other properties, so it constructed electronic 
auction scheme in [3-7]. Blind signature  which has been widely used on the confidentiality of message 
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information between users and signer compared with blind signature firstly presented by Abe and Fujsaki 
in 1982. After compared with other blind and partially blind signature protocols, Okamoto proposed his 
own protocol . In the paper, we proposed based on group signature and partially blind signature, On 
the basis of safety and efficiency of the electronic auction scheme based on group signatures, an 
optimization was done on the new scheme. It didn’t verify the identity of each bidder previous to the 
auction, however, in order to protect privacy of the successful bidder, we just verified the identity of 
successful bidder after the auction. Owing to reduce reliance on trusted third party, moreover, multiple 
goods are auctioned at the same time, therefore, this scheme suited to large-scale electronic auction. 
Furthermore, due to application of vickrey auctions on the two auction schemes in this thesis, the 
principle of optimal allocation of goods is easily satisfied, so it is more practical. 
[10]
2. Background and Preview 
2.1. Okamoto partially blind signature protocol
Let (  be bilinear paring, we also assume that the message , to be partially blindly signed 




Z ∗  , which is sharing message between user U  and signer ，and  is user 
message. 
S 1m
1. Key generation: Randomly select generators  and set 2 2 2 2 2, , ,g u v h G∈ 1 2( )g gψ= ,
1 2( )u uψ= , 1 2( )v vψ=  and 1 ( )h h2ψ= . Randomly select px Z ∗∈  and compute 
. The public and secret keys are:  2 2
x xg gω = 2 2( )G∈
Public key: 1 2 2 2 2 2, , , , ,g g u v h ω
Secret key: x
2. Partially blind signature generation: Signer  and user U  agree on common information  in 







1 1 1 1
m t m t t stX h g u v=
and sends X  to . Here,  is the message to be blindly signed along with common information . 




1, , ,t m t t st 0 11 1 1 1
m t m t t stX h g u v=  using the witness 
indistinguishable proof as follows: 
(1) U  randomly selects  from 1 2 3, ,a a a pZ
∗ , computes 
0 32 1 2
1 1 1( )
m aa a aW h g u v= 1
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    and sends W  to S .
(2)  randomly selects S pZη ∗∈  and sends η  to U .
(3) U  computes 
1 1 1 2 2 3 3mod , mod , modb a m t p b a t p b a st pη η η= + = + = +
    and sends  to .1 2 3( , , )b b b S
(4)  checks whether the following equation holds or not : S
0 32 1 2
1 1 1( )
m bb b bWX h g u vη = 1
    If it holds,  accepts. Otherwise, rejects and aborts.  S S
If  accepts the above protocol,  randomly selects  and computes S S , pr l Z
∗∈
( )11 2,x rl rY Xv R g+= =
and sends ( ,  to U , here , , )Y R l ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 111 1 1 1 1 t x rx r m mlv h g u v ++ += = s l t UY X .  randomly selects 
pf Z
∗∈ , and computes  
1( ) modft pτ −= , ,Y τσ = 12
f fRα ω −= , mods l t pβ = +
( , , )σ α β  is the partially blind signature of , where  is common information between 
and U , and  is blinded to .




3. Signature verification: Given a public-key , common information ,
message , and a signature ( ,
( 1 2 2 2 2 2, , , , ,g g w u v h 0m
















( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (0 11 2 2 2 2 1 2 1, , , , ,m me e g h g u v e U e w w e gβσ α α= = ),V⋅
If they hold, the verification result is valid; otherwise the result is invalid. 
3. The electronic auction scheme
3.1.  System initialization 
Let  is a  group. We assume that the order is  which is a large prime number, and the 
generator is Q . Set bilinear mapping 
1H GDH t
f  is 1 1: 2f H H H× → .
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2
The auctioneer must published all of auction symmetric keys. We assume that there are  auction, 
and their keys are . Set r  bidders in the auction, and their public key are 
.
n
1 2, , , nk k k Z
∗
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈
1 2, , , rP P P⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Firstly, randomly generate  for i  auction goods, set 2 2 2 2, , ,i i i ig u v h G∈
2 1 2 1, ( ), (i i iv v h1 2 1( ), ( )i i i ig g u u h 2 )iψ ψ ψ ψ= = = = . Secondly, randomly select i px Z ∗∈ , compute 
 and set tender value is  for i  auction goods. The auctioneer compute public 
and secret keys are:  
2 2 2
x
i ig Gω = ∈ i pm Z
∗∈
Public key: 1 2 2 2 2, , , , ,i i i i i ig g u v h ω 2
Secret key: ix
3.2.  Tender information generation 
In order to confirm i  auction goods, auctioneer  and bidders U  agree on common information 
 in a predetermined way.  
S
ik
U  randomly select  and compute ,i i ps t Z
∗∈ 1 1 1 1
i i i i i i ik t m t t s t
i i i iX h g u v=
S
 which is shared on between 
and U  in a predetermined way. In order to gain the trust of , U  prove that they have 
 as follows: 
S
( , , , )i i i it s ti it m t
    1. U  randomly select  from 1 2, ,a a a3 pZ  and computes  which is shared 
with  in a predetermined way. 
32 1 2
1 1 1( )i
k a a a




2.  randomly select S pZη ∗∈  which is shared with U  in a predetermined way. 
3. U  computes 1 1 2 2 3 3mod , mod , modi i i i ib a m t p b a t p b a s t pη η η= + = + = +  and share 
 with  in a predetermined way. 1 2( , )b b 3,b S
4.  checks whether the following equation holds or not : S
32 1 2
1 1 1 1( )i
k bb b b
i i i ih g u v WX
η
=
If it holds,  accepts. Otherwise, rejects and aborts.  S S
If  accepts U ,  randomly selects  and computes S S , pr l Z
∗∈
( )1 +1 2,x rl rY Xv R g= =
and sends ( ,  to U . U  randomly selects , )Y R l pf Z
∗∈ , and computes  
1 1
2( ) mod , , , mod
f fft p Y R s l t pτ σ α ω β− −= = = = +τ
( , , )σ α β  is the partially blind signature of ( , . U  sends )i ik m ( , , , )ik σ α β  to  at last. S
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3.3. Tender information submission 
The stage of tender information generation is over when the fixed time.  stops all the tender 
information exchange. U  need to send his tender value  to  at the same time.  
S
( , )i ik m S
Because auction is the large-scale network events, U  can send much tender information of different 
goods in the stage of tender information generation without additional burden and share tender value 
which can distinguish different goods through the secret key  with .ik S
3.4.  Winning bid information published 
S  don’t accept any tender information of U  after the stage of tender information submission and 
compute the highest value and the second high value through compare every tender value of goods. So 
the second high value 1 2, , , nM M M⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is the bid value of goods. 
3.5. Identity verification 
U  send his partially blind signature and identity to  when tender value higher than the winning 
bid. 
S
U  prove to  that his identity is legitimate as follows: S
1.  randomly select .jP j pv Z
∗∈
2.  randomly select jP i px Z
∗∈
)
 for other bidders  and compute ( )1 ,iP i r i≤ ≤ ≠ j
(1 ,ii iy x P i r i j= ≤ ≤ ≠
3.  compute jP , 1 2( , , , )kj vj r jf y y y v⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = which is only solution jy  and can solve the equation 
easily.
4. Because  is legitimate bidder, he can compute jP jx  through bilinear mapping. 
U  send identity and partially blind signature to  as  follows:  S
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( , , , , , ), ( , , , , , , , , )j j r i ik v x x x g g u v h ω σ α β⋅⋅⋅
S  need to verify identity and partially blind signature as follows: 
(1)  compute S ix  and iy  through ( )( 1, 2, , )i i iy g x i r= = ⋅⋅⋅
)
.
(2)  get S ( 1, 2, ,iy i = ⋅⋅⋅ r  and checks whether the following equation holds or not : 
, 1 2( , , , )kj vj r jf y y y v⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
If it holds,  accepts and continue. Otherwise,  rejects and restart until the new bidder identity is 
legitimate.  
S S
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2v
(3) When U  is a legitimate bidder,  checks whether the following equations holds or not:  S
0 1, , , 1,p p pm Z m Z Z Gβ σ α∗ ∗∈ ∈ ∈ ≠ ∈
( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2, , i ik m i ie e g h g u βσ ω α =
If they hold, U  is the successful bidder. Otherwise,  rejects and restart until define the successful 
bidder. 
S
4.  Security analysis 
1. The security of tender information. If dishonest auctioneer  generate other public-key 
 and 
'S
( ) 42 2 2 2 2, , ,g u vω ∈ g 2 )1 (g gψ= . Because 1 2, 3( , , , , )X W b bbη  and ( , , ,im σ α )β  which is 
partially blind signature completely independent, tender value is perfectly blind and is safe. 
2. The security of successful bidder price. If dishonest bidder  get other bidder tender value 
through illegal methods, he also can’t generate a new tender value which is higher than the old one. 
Because the security message in the tender information isn’t fake and bidder   can’t compute another 
tender information.  
'P
'P
3. The security of successful bidder identity. Because every  and  have  solutions in 
bilinear mapping, which is same probability in stage of tender information generation and is nothing with 
successful tenderer. The unsuccessful tenderer identity is secret, so bidders identity are safe.   
k v ( ) 12 rb −
4. The fairness of the auction. After the close of auction, the successful tenderer can’t deny, because 
he can be determined by auctioneer. The auctioneer can’t deny too, because the successful tenderer can 
complaint to management center.  
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, a new electronic auction scheme is proposed based on group signatures and partially 
blind signatures. At the same security strengthen, an optimization was done on the processes of electronic 
auction scheme and all dependence on trusted third party was reduced, moreover, multiple goods is 
auctioned at the same time, therefore, this scheme suited to large-scale electronic auction. Furthermore, 
due to application of vickrey auctions on the auction scheme, the principle of optimal allocation of goods 
is easily satisfied, so it is more practical. 
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